0 191 -13 Containment requirements: (a) Disposal systems for spent nuclear fuel or high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes shall be designed to provide a reasonable expectation, based upon performance assessments, that cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years after disposal from all significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system shall: (1) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 10 of exceeding the quantities calculated according to Table 1 (Appendix A); and (2) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 1,000 of exceeding ten times the quantities calculated according to Table 1 (Appendix A).
To help clarify the intent of 40 CFR 191, the EPA also published 40 CFR 194.6 There, the following elaboration on the intent of 40 CFR 191.13 is given Ref. 
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performance assessments shall be assembled into "complementary, cumulative distributions functions" (CCDFs) that represent the probability of exceeding various levels of cumulative release caused by all significant processes and events. (b) Probability distributions for uncertain disposal system parameter values used in performance assessments shall be developed and documented in any compliance application.
(c) Computational techniques, which draw random samples from across the entire range of the probability distributions developed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, shall be used in generating CCDFs and shall be documented in any compliance application. (d) The number of CCDFs generated shall be large enough such that, at cumulative releases of 1 and 10, the maximum CCDF generated exceeds the 99th percentile of the population of CCDFs with at least a 0.95 probability. (e) Any compliance application shall display the full range of CCDFs generated. (f) Any compIiance application shall provide information which demonstrates that there is at least a 95 percent level of statistical confidence that the mean of the population of CCDFs meets the containment requirements of 9 19 1.1 3 of this chapter.
In addition to the requirements in 40 CFR 191.13(a) and 40 CFR 194.34 just quoted, 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194 contain many additional requirements for the certification of the WIPP for the disposal of TRU waste. However, it is the indicated requirements that determine the overall structure of the 1996 WIPP PA and are the primary focus of this presentation. A complete description of the requirements that are placed on the WIPP and how these requirements are addressed is available in the CCA (pp. XWALK-1 to XWALK-36, Ref. 1).
Structure of 1996 WIPP PA
As discussed in earlier presentations?-g three basic entities (EN1, EN2, EN3) underlie the results required in 191. 13 and 194.34 and ultimately determine the conceptual and computational structure of the 1996 WIPP P A ENI, a probabilistic characterization of the likelihood of different futures occurring at the WIPP over the next 10,000 yr; EN2, a procedure for estimating the radionuclide releases to the accessible environment associated with each of the possible futures that could occur at the WIPP over the next 10,000 yr; and EN3, a probabilistic characterization of the uncertainty in the parameters used in the definition of EN1 and EN2. Together, EN1 and EN2 give rise to the CCDF specified in 191.13(a), and EN3 corresponds to the distributions indicated in 194.34(b).
The preceding entities arise from an attempt to answer three questions (Ql, Q2, Q3) about the WIPP: QI, "What occurrences could take place at the WIPP over the next 10,000 yr?"; Q2, "How likely are the different occurrences that could take place at the WIPP over the next 10, OOO yr?'; Q3. "What are the consequences of the different occurrences that could take place at the WIPP over the next 10,00Oyr?"; and one question (44) about the WIPP PA: Q4, "How much confidence should be placed in answers to the first three questions?". In the WIPP PA, EN1 provides answers to Q1 and Q2; EN2 provides an answer to Q3; and EN3
provides an answer to 44.
Careful definitions of the preceding entities are necessary for the computational implementation of the 1996 WIPP PA. However, the start of a PA for a complex system goes through a preliminary, and often rather ill-defined, phase in which it must be decided what is to be, and hence what is not to be, included in the analysis. It is from this work that the formal definitions of these entities ultimately emerge. For the 1996 WIPP PA, this initial work was carried out in an activity referred to as the identification and screening of features, events and processes (FEPs) (Sect. 6.2, Ref. 1).
The entity EN1 is the formal outcome of the FEPs process for determining what could happen at the WIPP and provides a probabilistic characterization of the likelihood of different futures that could occur at the WIPP over the next 10, OOO yr, with the period of 10,000 yr specified in 40 CFR 191. When viewed formally, EN1 is defined by a probability space (&, A,l, p,,) , with the sample space s, ,
given by s,, = { x,~: xst is a possible 10,000 yr sequence of occurrences at the WIPP}. (1) The subscript st refers to stochastic (i.e., aleatory) uncertainty and is used because in the 1996 WIPP PA, where n is the number of drilling intrusions in the vicinity of the WIPP, fj is the time (yr) of the ith intrusion, li designates the location of the cTh intrusion, ei designates the penetration of an excavated or nonexcavated area by the r@ intrusion, bi designates whether or not the zTh intrusion penetrates pressurized brine in the Castile Formation, pi designates the plugging procedure used with the iTh intrusion (ie., continuous plug, two discrete plugs, three discrete plugs), ai designates the type of waste penetrated by the ith intrusion (k, no waste, contacthandled (CH) waste, remotely-handled (RH) waste), and t k n is the time at which potash mining occurs within the land withdrawal boundary.
In the development of (&, d,, psf) , the probabilistic characterization of n, ti, li and ei derives from the assumption that drilling intrusions occur randomly in time and space (i.e., follow a Poisson process); the probabilistic characterization of bi derives from assessed properties of brine pockets; the probabilistic characterization of ai derives from the properties of the waste to be emplaced at the WIPP; and the probabilisric characterization of pi derives from current drilling practices in the T (x,,,O, fS-F(X,,,O) , fN-p[x,r, (S',, d,, p,,) andf (Fig. 1) .
The entity EN3 is the outcome of the data development effort for the WIPP and provides a probabilistic characterization of the uncertainty in the parameters that underlie the WIPP PA. When viewed formally, EN3 is defined by a probability space (S',, -d, , , p,,) , with the sample space S, , given by S' , = {xsu: x, , is possibly the correct vector of parameter values to use in the WIPP PA models}.
The subscript su refers to subjective (Le., epistemic) uncertainty and is used (Fig. I , Ref. 7) .
.. * .
Results
In the 1996 WIPP PA, the integral that defines the CCDF specified in 40 CFR 191.13(a) (Fig. 1) As indicated by the resultant distribution of CCDFs (Fig. 2 ), there is a kgh level of confidence that the requirements in 40 CFk 191.13(a) will be met. In particular, the distribution of CCDFs is substantially removed from the specified boundary line even when the effects of subjective uncertainty are incorporated into the analysis. In addition, the 1996 WIPP PA was designed to implement all the requirements in 40 CFR 194.34 (Chapt. 6, Ref. 11) . with the satisfaction of these requirements contributing to the assessed confidence that 40 CFR 191.13(a) is indeed met.
Status
Based on the CCA supported by the PA described in this presentation,' the EPA has issued a preliminary decision to certify the WIPP for the disposal of TRU waste.12 At present (April 1998), it appears likely that the WIPP will be in operation by the end of 1998. (2a) individual CCDFs, and (2b) mean and quantile curves (Fig. 3, Ref. 9 ).
